“We Will Fight Against Somber Times AndAgainst Slave Ideology.WeWill Fight Because You Get Nothing Without Fighting.We Will Fight In Memory Of Those Who HaveSacrificed Their Lives While Fighting.” – Translationof a Quote from a Naxalite Poster CHAPTERI INTRODUCTIONAND METHODOLOGY General 1. Left Wing Extremism inIndia. LeftWing extremist, also Known colloquially known as Maoists and Naxalites has beenperceived as major if not the most credible internal security threat to India’snational security. There are more than 30 Left Wing Extremists groups inoperation in the country. The objective of the Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is towage an armed revolution, modelled on the lines of the Chinese revolution,which they often call as New Democratic Revolution.
Communist politicalmovement in India emerged in 1920 and over a period of time grew into many streams.While all of its proponents profess adherence to the ultimate goal of buildinga classless society, there are disagreements about the methodology and strategyto achieve it. The origin of use of violence as a means of achieving theultimate goal, can be traced back to the Naxal movement in 1967. 2.
India being the largestdemocracy in term of population base & also one of fastest growingeconomies is deeply concerned about the security developments that occur bothwithin & beyond the borders. Among the various internal security threatsIndia face at present, LWE remains a major challenge since its origin in 1967.The magnitude of the threat can be assessed by the fact that close to 60districts in India are seriously affected by LWE. Till now the onus of combatingLWE has been with various State Police & CAPF/PMF. However inadequacy ofthe Police & CAPF/PMF has led to discussion of a possible future activeCombat role for Indian Army in LWE affected areas. The discussions have oftenquoted the long experience of Indian Army in Combating Insurgency in NE, Punjab & J. However,the fact that the terrain, sit, ground realities, environment & Players ofLWE are in total contrast with other insurgencies in India where Indian Armyhas been employed in an active role. Theresearch will seek to identify these differences and Changes required to negatethe deficiencies at tactical level, for Indian Army to be employed in CombatingLWE in a future scenario.
Figure 1 : LWE Conflict Mapof India 2017, Based on 2016 Data LiteratureReview 3. In his book, The Naxalthreat : Causes, State Responses & Consequences, Lt Gen VR Raghavan(retd),one of the leading military strategic thinkers, brings out the genesis, rootcauses, growth of naxalism, its present status and response by the state andits outcome. In chapter six he explains the various challenges faced by Policeand other CAPF/PMF in combating LWE/ Naxals. In a gist it has been attributedto lack of sound strategy and other inadequacies at Operational and Tacticallevel including lack of resources, training, intelligence and leadership. 4.
Mr VK Ahluwalia in his book Rd Revolution2020 and beyond in a similar manner has covered all facets of the genesis,ideology, ground realities, strategic challenges and also the strategy forconflict resolution. He goes on to suggest a possible active role for IndianArmy in combating LWE and the requirement and justification for doing so. 5. In his article, Employmentof Armed Forces against the Naxals, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik has attempted tovalidate, why armed forces should not be employed to actively combat LWE.However, he has also visualised a limited participation, primarily in training,Intelligence gathering, leadershiptraining and provision of air assets including UAVs. He has justified as to whyPolice and CAPF/PMF should be the lead agency for combating LWE. 6. Previous research conductedat the DSSC on the subject includes analysing the threat posed by LWE, Need fora National Strategy for combating LWE, Changes required in the training ofCAPF/PMF and Implications & future dimensions of threat.
7. Identificationof the Gaps. Themajority of the literature available has primarily been concentrated upon thegenesis and rai-son d’etre for spread of LWE ideology and use of violence asmeans of achieving the ends. The socio-econ reasons for the rise of LWE hasalso been well researched upon. The various researchers have also focussed onthe state response to handle the issue and also the inadequacies and failure ofgovernment strategy in able to contain or resolve the issue. The reasons forfailure of Police and CAPF/PMF to combat the LWE has been also identified bymany, and use of Indian Army to combat LWE has been suggested as a finalmeasure.
However no research has been carried out in identifying the variousinadequacies in Indian army to take on such a task. Therefore, it is imperativeto conduct a research on identifying such lacunas and suggesting remedialmeasures. Researchproblem 8. The a/m Topic has thefollowing Research Problems :- (a) Salient aspects of differences between LWE& Other Insurgencies in India. (b) Changes reqd in tac level trg of Indian Army. (c) Changes reqd in conduct of tac ops. (d) Changes reqd in wpn & eqpt.
(e) Changes in structuring of units/ subunits. (f) Framework & methods of Int Collection (g) Psy& HR Trg. Objectivesof the Study 9. The Indian Army has beenactively employed in countering various Insurgencies in NE, Punjab, J&k andhas been successful in containing and eliminating certain Insurgencies. Over aperiod of time the Indian Army has evolved a methodology and Strategy tocounter these Insurgencies. However the primary roleof the Army remains to safeguard the nation against external threat. To combata particular insurgency the army has to undergo changes at both operational andtactical level which involves changes in training, structuring ofunits/subunits, weapon and equipment profile suited to meet the requirementsand also the conduct of various tactical operations.
It is pertinent to mentionthat all these changes are peculiar to and Insurgency based upon thegeographical location, demographic pattern, terrain, Insurgent groups, andactual ground situation. Therefore, to understand the peculiarities of andinsurgencies and more importantly to identify the changes required tosuccessfully combat the Insurgency is of paramount importance. 10. The specific objectives ofthe study are as follows :-(a) The changes required in the existing weaponand equipment profile of the Indian Army to successfully conduct tactical leveloperations in LWE affected areas.
(b) Changes required in Conductof various tactical operations.(c) Changes required in theorganisational structure of units/subunits and recommended restructuring. Hypothesis 11.
The hypothesis is “For Conduct of successful tactical operations (Quantifiable) in LWEaffected areas in a possible future active employment scenario (DependentVariable) there are changes required in the Indian army withrespect to its current weapon and equipment profile, Tactical operationsmethodology & Organisational Structure at Unit/Subunit Level (Independent Variables).” Researchmethodology 12. Methodsof Data Collection – Primary. (a) Questionnaire. (i) Pilot Survey. Apilot questionnaire was prepared and sent to a sample comprising ten studentsfrom B Division of DSSC, Wellington. (ii) Final Survey. (aa) Questionnaire.
A final Questionnaire comprising 16 questionsbased on Likert’s scale & two Yes/No type questions. The questionnaireattached as Appendix A was fieldedin ‘Google Forms’. (ab) Sample.
The responses of Questionnaire are awaited. 13. Methodsof Data Collection – Secondary.(a) There is ample amount ofliterature available on the LWE and various aspects related to it includingspecific to Indian context. However, there is almost no literature availablespecific to the topic chosen.
CHAPTERII BACKGROUNDAND GENESIS OF METHODOLOGY AND CONDUCT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS IN LWE AFFECTEDAREAS Backgroundof Conduct of Anti LWE Tactical Operations 14. There is no ambiguity instating that LWE and the violence associated with it is the most intriguing anddangerous impediment to the internal security situation and National securityof India. However, it will be grossly incorrect to categorise it as a law andorder problem. It is a complicated case of amalgamation of tribal, socio,economic, political and cultural problems of the local populace of the LWEaffected areas. The graveness and seriousness of the problem has beenhistorically neglected by the consecutive governments and policy makers.
However, it was only after the surge in the violence that the policy makers atthe apex level realized the gravity of the situation. Former Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh had described the LWEas “India’s biggest internal security challenge ever” (Akhoury 2006).Recognising the LWE movement as a serious problem, Prime Minister (PM) Modiurged the extremists to “shun the gun for a few days and visit the familiesaffected by their violence … Those children would certainly inspire misguidedyouth to lay down arms forever…This experiment will force you to change yourheart and make you shun your violent means”1.Therefore, once the Policy makers and the government realised the seriousnessof the issue it contemplated taking steps to control the violence and resolvethe issue. The first logical step in resolving the issue is to restrict andcontrol the violence. Before, analysing the methodology of conduct of anti LWEoperations, it is imperative to briefly review the genesis and evolut the LWEphenomenon in India.
15. Brief Overview of the Historical Perspectiveof LWE/ Naxal Phenomenon In India. Detailedelaboration of the rise and evolution of LWE in India is beyond the scope ofthis research.
However, it will be pertinent to draw out the genesis of the LWEphenomenon so as to deduce the philosophy and nature of violence promulgated byNaxal groups. The pre Independence nature and evolution of LWE/ Mao inspiredactivities is well documented. However, if parallels has to be drawn to theexisting situation, then it all started in 1967. The LWE/ Naxal ideologyinspired violence started in year 1967 in Naxalbari district of West Bengal bythe Santhal Peasants.2 Themovement was led by fiery leaders like Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal.
This led to forming of the CPI – ML. The rebelliongained support in rural areas of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. The violencewas specifically channelized towards Class enemies. However, soon it began expandinginto urban spaces as well, especially in Kolkata. As per the records, therewere a total of 4000 cases of violence attributable to Naxal movement between1970-71.The government and Police at that time were proactive and undertook numerousoperations to curb the movement. The operations and specific Naxal relatedviolence per se culminated with Operation Steeple Chase I ( 1 Jul – 15 Aug1971).
The success of the Police and in certain cases even small level participationby the Army, can be attributed to facts that the tribals were poorly armed,there was a lack of centralized leadership and command structure and the areaswhere the rebellion occurred had good connectivity leading to faster reactionby the security forces. The movement further deteriorated and weakened due toemergency. However, it had also led to emergence of groups like MCC in Bihar. 16. TheSecond Phase.1Vivekananda International Foundation. LWE – A Brief Security Review.
New Delhi,Vifiindia.org, Jul 2017. 2 Bakshi,GD.
LWE in India : Context, Implications& Response Options. Manekshaw Papers. New Delhi : CLAWS Journal, 2009 :Pp21.